Some New Papers:
(Non-technical pieces are marked with a "*".)
Philosophy of AI:
“From LLMs to the Global Brain: The Emergence of Planetary-Scale Artificial Intelligence,” (in press), Disputatio 71. (Subject of a special issue of Disputatio.)
I advance the Global Brain Argument, contending that escalating hyperintelligent AI systems, from savant-level LLMs to superintelligences, will connect human users, cloud platforms and the Internet-of-Things to form one or more emergent global brain networks—planetary scale complex adaptive systems that process information, evolve goals and exhibit agential behaviors. I analyse the premises of the argument, contrast the notion of AGI from my notions of savant and hyperintelligent systems, and defend the claim that many humans are becoming d-nodes in a global brain network. I then raise the AI Megasystem Control Problem: the problem of how disparate proprietary AI services may self-organize into opaque, weakly emergent megasystems that elude traditional AI alignment techniques. I also delve into the ethical implications of the argument, such as surveillance capitalism, epistemic manipulation and dual-use risks and discuss the relationship between the argument and the extended mind hypothesis.
“Chatbot Epistemology,” Social Epistemology, 1–20. (You can submit a reply to this paper by submitting to the following professional epistemology journal site: Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective)
This piece considers the epistemological challenges that arise with the increasingly widespread use of AI chatbots. I articulate a problem that they present—the ‘boiling frog problem’. According to the metaphor, if you boil a frog by putting it in scalding water, it will try to save itself, but if you put the frog in a pot of tepid water, it will remain unaware of the rising water temperature and therefore, make no attempt to escape to save itself. In both cases, the outcome is the same—the frog dies. Likewise, I argue that the combination of factors I identify in this piece, over time, will give rise to detrimental engagements with chatbots and ultimately, to diminished human autonomy. The factors I consider include problems with digital privacy, misplaced epistemic trust in AI companions, LLM emergence, the use of personality profiling and adaptive language, misattributing sentience to LLMs, and more.
For a nontechnical discussion of some of these issues see: “AI Already Knows Us too Well,” Nautilus, June, 2025. https://nautil.us/ai-already-knows-us-too-well-1220707/?_sp=fe281a65-5b50-4986-bfc1-896e9d6683ff.1751921501893
External World Skepticism: Illusory World Skepticism
“Illusory world skepticism,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 109 (3):1049-1057 (2024)
l argue that a skeptical scenario involving deception about the external world is a genuine possibility, even if David Chalmers is correct that simulations are real. I call this new skeptical position “Illusory World Skepticism.” Illusory World Skepticism draws from the simulation argument,together with work in physics,astrobiology, and AI,to argue that we may indeed be in an illusory world—a universe scale simulation orchestrated by a deceptive AI—the technophilosopher’s ultimate evil demon. In Section One I urge that Illusory World Skepticism is a bone fide skeptical possibility. In Section Two, I explore features of quantum computation. Then, in Sections Three and Four, I draw from the discussion of quantum computation and assume that the simulation argument is correct,applying considerations from the fields of astrobiology and AI safety to illustrate that illusory world skepticism constitutes what I call “a serious epistemic threat”, a scenario that cannot be dismissed as requiring that knowledge is certainty or which seems to just depict a remote, fictional situation.
The Prototime Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics, Panpsychism and Superpsychism:
Superpsychism, Susan Schneider & Mark Bailey
Journal of Consciousness Studies (forthcoming as a target paper of a journal special issue in early fall, 2025).
Abstract. Two of life’s greatest mysteries are the phenomena of consciousness and the nature of spacetime. Herein, we use quantum entanglement as an inroad to both, developing a new “superpsychist” panpsychist theory. First, we frame and defend a position in which spacetime emerges from an aspatial, quasi-temporal, reality called “prototime.” We call this view of quantum phenomena the “Prototime Interpretation.” Then, based on our position on entanglement, we develop a new version of panpsychism, which we call “Superpsychism.” According to Superpsychism, the fundamental level of physics has a more advanced form of consciousness than spacetime occupants do, in the sense that it exhibits maximal coherence, zero entropy and holistic integration of conscious states. Whereas cosmospychists like Goff (2017) and Nagasawa and Wager (2020) locate the fundamental unit of consciousness in the very big, we claim the greatest form of consciousness is found in the holistically entangled structure that is not even spatiotemporal and which underlies spacetime itself.
“The Prototime Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics,” with Mark Bailey. In Dean Rickles (ed.), Philosophy of Physics, Routledge, 2026.
We propose the Prototime Interpretation of quantum mechanics, which claims that quantum entanglement occurs in a "prototemporal" realm which underlies spacetime. We claim that the Prototime Interpretation (PI) is worthy of further consideration as a superior explanation for perplexing quantum phenomena such as delayed choice, superposition, the wave-particle duality and nonlocality. In Section One, we introduce the Prototime Interpretation. Section Two identifies its advantages. Section Three discusses several implications of the view, such as its deterministic nature and relation to the simulation hypothesis.
Tests for AI Consciousness:
“Emergent Spacetime, the Megastructure Problem, and the Metaphysics of the Self.” Philosophy East and West 74 (2): 314-332. 2024. (Reply to special issue on Artificial You in this journal). The aim of this article is to introduce new thoughts on some pressing topics relating to my book, Artificial You, ranging from the fundamental nature of reality to quantum theory and emergence in large language models (LLM) like GPT-4.
“Testing for Consciousness in Machines: An Update on the ACT Test for the Case of LLMs”,Susan Schneider. Current Biology 33 (R1-R10) (2024) (Note, this is part of a longer piece in which various scholars contributed commentaries).
This piece urges that the ACT can be updated for the case of LLMs, providing a ‘marker’ to those systems that passed the updated ACT. (Note: this is not my current view because I believe there is an ‘error theory’ that precludes concluding from LLM behavior that the behavior is evidence of consciousness. For a brief explanation see the non-technical piece below.)
“If a Chatbot Tells You it is Conscious Should you Believe it?”* https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/if-a-chatbot-tells-you-it-is-conscious-should-you-believe-it/)
——-
Metaphysics, Physicalism and the Mind-Body Problem
- “Idealism, or Something Near Enough," Kenny Pearce and Tyron Goldschmidt (eds.) Idealism: New Essays in Metaphysics, Oxford University Press.
- The Problem of the Physical Base: How the Mathematical Nature of Physics Undermines Physicalism, subject of a special issue of The Journal of Consciousness Studies.
- Non-reductive Physicalism and the Mind Problem, Nous, Vol. 47, Number 1, March 2013. pp. 135-153.
- Non-reductive Physicalism Cannot Accept Token Identity, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 85, Number 3, November 2012. pp. 719-228.
- Why Property Dualists must Reject Substance Physicalism, Philosophical Studies, Vol. 157, Number 1, Jan. 2012.
- "What Breathes Fire into the Equations?" Response to Critics, The Journal of Consciousness Studies, special issue on Schneider, Sept., 2017.
- The Metaphysics of Uploading, (with Joe Corabi), Journal of Consciousness Studies. (Symposium on a piece by David Chalmers, with his response.) Reprinted in Uploaded Minds (with postscript), Russell Blackford (ed.) Wiley-Blackwell.
- "Emergent Spacetime, Panpsychism, and the Nature of Consciousness," Scientific American*
- What is the Significance of the Intuition that Laws Govern? Australasian Journal of Philosophy, June, 2007.
- Events, IEP. (From my graduate school days, but a useful survey of events).
- Alien Individuals, Alien Universals, and Armstrong's Combinatorial Theory of Modality, The Southern Journal of Philosophy, Winter 2002.
Artificial Intelligence, and Computational Approaches to Thought
- “Illusory World Skepticism,” Philosophy and Phenomenal Research, Dec. 2024. (On Chalmers’ Reality+, a new form of external world skepticsm, and the Simulation Argument. Please see the journal for the final corrected version,)
- "How to Catch an AI Zombie: Testing for Consciousness in Machines", in Matthew Liao and David Chalmers, forthcoming, OUP.
- ”How Philosophy of Mind can Shape the Future" in Philosophy of Mind in the 20th and 21th Century, (with Pete Mandik), Amy Kind (ed.), forthcoming with Routledge, 2016. (The final chapter of a four volume set on the history of philosophy of mind.)*
- The Nature of Symbols in the Language of Thought, Mind and Language, Vol. 24, No. 4, Nov., 2009.
- "Alien Minds," In Dick, S.J. (ed.), The Impact of Discovering Life Beyond Earth, Cambridge University Press, pp. 189–206. (Interdisciplinary astrobiology volume.)*
- "Concepts, Symbols, Computation: An Integrative Approach" (with Janelle Salisbury) in M. Sprevak, M. Colombo (eds.) The Routledge Handbook of the Computational Mind. Routledge, 2019.
- LOT, CTM, and the Elephant in the Room, Synthese, Winter, 2009.
- Fodor’s Challenge to the Classical Computational Theory of Mind, (with Kirk Ludwig). Mind and Language, 2008.
- Yes, It Does: A Diatribe on Jerry Fodor’s The Mind Doesn’t Work That Way, Psyche, 2007.
- Direct Reference, Psychological Explanation, and Frege Cases, Mind and Language, Sept., 2005.
- Daniel Dennett’s Theory of Consciousness, in my Blackwell Companion to Consciousness, 2007.
- Chinese translation. In Philosophical Analysis, (Fu Bin, translator). Shanghai People’s Publishing House and Institute of Philosophy of Shanghai Academy of Social Science, 2012.
- The Language of Thought, for The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Psychology, John Symons and Paco Calvo, editors, 2009.
- Rethinking the Language of Thought, (with Matt Katz). WIRES: Cognitive Science, Wiley-Blackwell, forthcoming. (Solicited overview of my work on LOT.)
- Conceptual Atomism Rethought, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, June 2010.
- "Superintelligent AI and the Postbiological Cosmos Approach" in Lursch, A., What is Life? On Earth and Beyond, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, (interdisciplinary astrobiology volume).*
Ethics of Brain Enhancement, the Singularity, and the Nature of the Person
- "Artificial Intelligence, Consciousness and Moral Status," Routledge Handbook in Neuroethics, Syd Johnson, ed., 2017.*
- ”How Philosophy of Mind can Shape the Future" (with Pete Mandik) in Philosophy of Mind in the 20th and 21th Century, Amy Kind (ed.), forthcoming with Routledge, 2016. (The final chapter of a four volume set on the history of philosophy of mind.)
- "Superintelligent AI and the Postbiological Cosmos Approach" in Lursch, A., What is Life? On Earth and Beyond, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.*
- "Alien Minds," in Dick, S., Discovery, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015.*
- The Metaphysics of Uploading, (with Joe Corabi), forthcoming in a special issue of the Journal of Consciousness Studies. (Symposium on a piece by David Chalmers, with his response.) Reprinted in Uploaded Minds (with postscript), Russell Blackford (ed.) Wiley-Blackwell, 2014.
- Transcending and Enhancing the Human Brain, inScience Fiction and Philosophy. (Note: this is for an interdisciplinary audience.) Reprinted in, Brain Minds, Selves and Others: Neuroscience, Neurotechnology and the Social Good. James Giordano, editor. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011.*
- “The Philosophy of Her.” The New York Times. (Opinion piece on AI, personal identity, and brain uploading. Pg. 1 of the digital edition. Top ten most emailed.)*
- Cognitive Enhancement and the Nature of Persons, for The University of Pennsylvania Bioethics Reader, Art Caplan and Vardit Radvisky, eds., 2009, pp. 844-856.*
Media Pieces and Book Introductions
- “If a Chatbot Tells You it is Conscious Should you Believe it?”, Scientific American, June 2025. https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/if-a-chatbot-tells-you-it-is-conscious-should-you-believe-it/)
- “AI Already Knows Us Too Well,” Nautilus, June 2025.
- “Artificial Intelligence Needs Guardrails and Global Cooperation”, (with Kyle Kilian), The Wall Street Journal, 2024.
- “AI Shouldn’t Decide What is True”, (with Mark Bailey), Nautilus.
- Emergent Spacetime, Panpsychism, and the Nature of Consciousness,"Scientific American
- “The Philosophy of Her.” The New York Times. (Opinion piece on AI, personal identity, and brain uploading. Pg. 1 of the digital edition. Top ten most emailed.)*
- "Is Anyone Home? A Way to Find out if AI is Self Aware", Scientific American (with Edwin Turner).*
- "It May not Feel Like Anything to be an Alien," (on AI consciousness, etc.) Nautilus, 2017.*
- "The Problem of AI Consciousness,"Huffington Post, March 2016.*
- "Goodbye, Little Green Men," The Huffington Post (with Seth Shostak, SETI Institute).*
- “Science Fiction Thought Experiments as a Window into Philosophical Puzzles.” Introduction to my Science Fiction and Philosophy.*
- Consciousness Studies: An Introduction to the Issues, (with Max Velmans), introduction to our Blackwell Companion to Consciousness. (Please use “look inside” feature at Amazon)*
- The Language of Thought: Ch 1*